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Executive Summary 
Trust is a key factor in the effectiveness of the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) service, for-
merly known as the Commercial Mobile Alert Service (CMAS). Alert originators (AOs) working 
at emergency management agencies (EMAs) must trust WEA to deliver alerts to the public in an 
accurate and timely manner. Absent this trust, AOs will not use WEA. Members of the public 
must also trust the WEA service. They must understand and believe the messages that they re-
ceive before they will act on them. Clearly, the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA), the EMAs, and the AOs must all strive to maximize and maintain trust in the WEA ser-
vice if it is to be an effective alerting tool. 
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T) 
tasked the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) with developing a WEA trust 
model. The purpose of this model was to provide data that would enable FEMA to maximize the 
effectiveness of WEA and provide guidance for AOs that would support them in using WEA in a 
manner that maximized public safety. This effort resulted in two separate models: a public trust 
model to examine the degree of trust that the public will have in the WEA system and the result-
ing alerts and an AO trust model to examine the degree of trust that AOs will have in the WEA 
system. Section 1 overviews the models. 
We used Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) to model trust in WEA. The BBN provides a way to 
describe complex probabilistic reasoning in a graphical format, and its main use is in situations 
that require statistical inference. A key feature of BBNs is that they enable modeling and reason-
ing about uncertainty. The BBN forces the assessor to expose all assumptions about the impact of 
different forms of evidence, so it provides a visible and auditable dependability or safety argu-
ment. We developed the two trust models using AgenaRisk, Version 6.0, a commercial software 
application suited for BBN modeling. Section 2 details the procedures used to run simulations on 
the trust models with this application. 
For each trust model, we ran four types of simulations. Single-factor simulations focused on as-
sessing the sensitivity of the 20 individual factors identified in the public trust model. Multifactor 
simulations investigated interactions between combinations of factors within and across groups of 
factors. Random-input simulations used stochastic samples of input variables. Special-case simu-
lations addressed specific combinations of inputs variables determined to drive the model outputs 
to extreme values. Sections 3 and 4 include the simulations run on each factor and group of fac-
tors investigated. 
The purpose of the trust model and the multitude of simulation runs is to identify factors and prac-
tices that enhance or degrade trust. The analysis process had two goals: to identify those simula-
tions that predicted the highest levels of trust and those simulations that predicted the lowest 
levels of trust. Section 5 includes the steps of this analysis process and the results for each trust 
model. 
The public and AO trust models are available for download at the following URLs: 
 http://www.sei.cmu.edu/community/wea-project/public-bbn.cfm  
 http://www.sei.cmu.edu/community/wea-project/ao-bbn.cfm 
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Those wishing to run their own simulations and study trust factors in their own contexts of emer-
gency alerting may download them from there.  
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Abstract 
Trust is a key factor in the effectiveness of the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) service. Alert 
originators must trust WEA to deliver alerts to the public in an accurate and timely manner. 
Members of the public must also trust the WEA service before they will act on the alerts that they 
receive. This research aimed to develop a trust model to enable the Federal Emergency Manage-
ment Agency to maximize the effectiveness of WEA and provide guidance for alert originators 
that would support them in using WEA in a manner that maximizes public safety. This report 
overviews the public trust model and the alert originator trust model. The research method includ-
ed Bayesian belief networks (BBNs) to model trust in WEA because they enable reasoning about 
and modeling of uncertainty. The report details the procedures used to run simulations on the trust 
models. For each trust model, single-factor, multifactor, random-input, and special-case simula-
tions were run on each factor and group of factors investigated. The analysis of the simulations 
had two goals: to identify those simulations that predicted the highest levels of trust and those 
simulations that predicted the lowest levels of trust. This report includes the results for each trust 
model. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Overview of the Wireless Emergency Alerts 
The Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) service, formerly known as the Commercial Mobile Alert 
Service (CMAS), enhances public safety by providing authorized emergency management agen-
cies (EMAs) with the capability to issue alerts and warnings to mobile communication devices 
(e.g., cell phones) in a designated geographic area. WEA is a component of the Integrated Public 
Alert and Warning System (IPAWS) operated by the Federal Emergency Management Agency 
(FEMA) in cooperation with the Federal Communications Commission and supported by the De-
partment of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate (DHS S&T). 
WEA messages may be initiated by authorized national, state, local, tribal, and territorial EMAs. 
Three categories of WEA messages may be sent: 
1. Presidential – Only the president of the United States may issue a Presidential Alert. This 
message enables the president to alert or warn a specific region or the nation as a whole of an 
event of critical importance. 
2. Imminent Threat – EMAs may issue alerts to specific geographic areas affected by an imme-
diate or expected threat of extreme or severe consequences. Threats may arise from a number 
of sources, including weather conditions (e.g., tornadoes, flash floods), law enforcement ac-
tions (e.g., riots, gunfire), fires, and environmental hazards (e.g., chemical spills, gas releas-
es). 
3. Americas Missing: Broadcast Emergency Response (AMBER) – EMAs may issue AMBER 
Alerts for missing or abducted children. 
WEA messages are initiated by the EMAs and transmitted to the IPAWS Open Platform for 
Emergency Networks (IPAWS-OPEN) system using the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP) for-
mat. After authentication and verification, IPAWS-OPEN processes the WEA message and sends 
it to the commercial mobile service providers (CMSPs). The CMSPs broadcast the alert from cell 
towers in the designated geographic area to all compatible cellular devices. The cellular devices 
produce a distinctive ringtone, vibration pattern, or both and display the WEA message. 
1.2 Trust Models for the Wireless Emergency Alerts 
Trust is a key factor in the effectiveness of the WEA service. Alert originators (AOs) working at 
EMAs must trust WEA to deliver alerts to the public in an accurate and timely manner. Absent 
this trust, AOs will not use WEA. Members of the public must also trust the WEA service. They 
must understand and believe the messages that they receive before they will act on them. Clearly, 
FEMA, the EMAs, and the AOs must all strive to maximize and maintain trust in the WEA ser-
vice if it is to be an effective alerting tool. 
In 2012, DHS S&T tasked the Carnegie Mellon Software Engineering Institute (SEI) with devel-
oping a WEA trust model. The purpose of this model was to provide data that would enable 
FEMA to maximize the effectiveness of WEA and provide guidance for AOs that would support 
them in using WEA in a manner that maximized public safety. At a high level, our approach to 
this task was to build models that could predict the levels of AO trust and public trust in specific 
 CMU/SEI-2013-SR-026 | 2 
scenarios, validate these models using data collected from AOs and the public, and execute simu-
lations on these models to identify recommendations to AOs and FEMA. We built two separate 
models:  
1. a public trust model to examine the degree of trust that the public will have in the WEA sys-
tem and the resulting alerts 
2. an AO trust model to examine the degree of trust that AOs will have in the WEA system 
We executed simulations on these models for numerous scenarios to identify both recommenda-
tions to AOs and FEMA for actions to take that increase trust and for actions to avoid that de-
crease trust. 
Results of this work consist of 
 Wireless Emergency Alerts: Trust Model Technical Report, a detailed technical report de-
scribing the process employed in the development and validation of the trust models and the 
resulting structure and functionality of the models [Stoddard 2013] 
 a technical report (this report) detailing the scenarios and simulations executed on the trust 
models 
 Maximizing Trust in the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) Service, a nontechnical report 
analyzing the results of the simulations and identifying trust-enhancing practices to be em-
ployed and trust-degrading processes to be avoided by both AOs and FEMA [Woody 2013] 
Note that this report presents only the results of the trust model simulations. It does not attempt to 
interpret them. For interpretation, see the Maximizing Trust in the Wireless Emergency Alerts 
(WEA) Service report. 
1.2.1 Bayesian Belief Models 
A Bayesian belief network (BBN) is a way of describing complex probabilistic reasoning via a 
graphical format. The main use of BBNs is in situations that require statistical inference. A BBN 
is a directed graph, together with an associated set of probability tables [Fenton 2008]. The graph 
consists of nodes and arcs. The nodes represent variables, which can be discrete or continuous. 
The arcs represent causal or influential relationships between variables. Figure 1 shows a simple 
example. 
 
Figure 1: Example of a Directed Graph 
Weather 
forecast 
Umbrella 
order 
Sunglasses 
order 
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This example examines the sales of two stores, Superior Sunglass Sales (SSS) and Rainy Day 
Umbrellas (RDU). 
 Both SSS and RDU receive their supplies from Ajax Distributing Company. 
 When the weather forecast is favorable, sales of sunglasses increase. On 70% of those sunny 
days, SSS places orders for sunglasses with Ajax. But on rainy days, sunglass sales decrease, 
and SSS places orders with Ajax on only 20% of those days. 
 When the weather forecast is unfavorable, sales of umbrellas increase. On 90% of those rainy 
days, RDU places orders for umbrellas with Ajax. But on sunny days, umbrella sales de-
crease, and RDU places orders with Ajax on only 10% of those days. 
 Sunny days outnumber rainy days 7 to 3. 
We can summarize this information in several node probability tables, as shown in Table 1. 
Table 1: Node Probability Tables 
 Probability  
 
Probability 
Sunny forecast 70%  Sunny Forecast Rainy Forecast 
Rainy forecast 30%  Order from SSS 70% 20% 
   No order from SSS 30% 80% 
      
   
 
Probability 
   Sunny Forecast Rainy Forecast 
   Order from RDU 10% 90% 
   No order from RDU 80% 10% 
 
Given this information, we can use Bayesian statistics to make some inferences and predictions. 
For example, the overall probability that Ajax will receive an order from SSS is the combination 
of probabilities for sunny and rainy days: 
 
 CMU/SEI-2013-SR-026 | 4 
Likewise, the probability that RDU will place an order is 
݌(ܴܦܷ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ) = (0.7 ∗ 0.1) +	(0.3 ∗ 0.9) = 0.34 
We can now apply the Bayes theorem to examine some resulting relationships. The Bayes theo-
rem states,  
݌(ܣ|ܤ) = 	
݌(ܤ|ܣ) ∗ ݌(ܣ)	
___________
݌(ܤ)
 
where: 
p(A|B) = probability of event A, given that event B has occurred 
p(B|A) = probability of event B, given that event A has occurred 
p(A) = probability of occurrence of event A 
p(B) = probability of occurrence of event B 
From Table 1, we know the probabilities of an SSS order and an RDU order in the event of a sun-
ny forecast: 
݌(ܵܵܵ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ	|	ݏݑ݊݊ݕ) = 0.7 
݌(ܴܦܷ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ	|	ݏݑ݊݊ݕ) = 0.1 
Using the Bayes theorem, we reverse this and calculate the probability that there is a sunny fore-
cast if we know that SSS has placed an order: 
݌(ݏݑ݊݊ݕ	|	ܵܵܵ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ) = ݌(ܵܵܵ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ	|	ݏݑ݊݊ݕ) ∗ ݌(ݏݑ݊݊ݕ)݌(ܵܵܵ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ)
										= 	0.7 ∗ 0.70.54 = 	0.91
 
In this example, we initially believed that the probability of a sunny forecast was 70%. However, 
faced with the additional evidence that SSS has placed an order, we can update our belief to rec-
ognize that the probability of a sunny forecast is now 91%. 
With this new knowledge, we can take this analysis further. We can calculate the probability that 
RDU will place an order, given the observation that SSS has placed an order. 
݌(ܴܦܷ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ	|	ܵܵܵ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ) = [݌(ܴܦܷ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ|ݏݑ݊݊ݕ) ∗ ݌(ݏݑ݊݊ݕ)] +	
																																																				[݌(ܴܦܷ_݋ݎ݀݁ݎ|ݎܽ݅݊ݕ) 	∗ ݌(ݎܽ݅݊ݕ)]
																																													= (0.1 ∗ 0.91) + (0.9 ∗ 0.09) = 	0.17
 
Again, we initially believed that the probability of receiving an order from RDU was 34%. But 
given the evidence that Ajax has received an SSS order, we can update our belief to a 17% chance 
that Ajax will receive an RDU order. 
The key feature of BBNs is that they enable us to model and reason about uncertainty. The BBN 
forces the assessor to expose all assumptions about the impact of different forms of evidence and 
hence provides a visible and auditable dependability or safety argument. 
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1.2.2 Public Trust Model 
The public trust model examines the interaction of factors that influence the public’s trust in the 
WEA service and the alerts issued through it. Through research of public alerting literature and 
discussions with experts in the field of public alerting, we identified the factors contributing to 
trust and their interactions. Figure 2 shows the results of these efforts in a directed graph, in which 
arrows show the relationships between factors. 
 
Figure 2: WEA Public BBN Expanded 
We quantified the relationships between these factors through surveys and validated them with 
interviews of representatives of the public. We captured the results in a BBN implemented on 
AgenaRisk, a commercial platform suited for BBN modeling. For details about the creation of the 
model and the BBN, see the Wireless Emergency Alerts: Trust Model Technical Report [Stoddard 
2013]. 
Table 2 and Table 3 show the model inputs and outputs, respectively. 
Table 2: Factor Descriptions for Public Model Inputs 
Factor Description 
1 Relevance Applicability of the alert to the receiver. Does it affect the receiver’s 
current location? Is it received at the appropriate time? 
10 Action to take A definitive statement of action to be taken 
12 Alert source The governmental tier of the sender (i.e., local, county, state, federal) 
15 Easy additional follow-us mechanisms Ease of obtaining additional information from the sender via other 
communications channels 
20 History of relevance The applicability of previously received alerts to the recipient 
21 Clarity of message, spelling, grammar, 
and content 
The degree of grammar and spelling errors in the alert 
23 Who should act A definitive statement of which recipients should take the actions 
specified in the alert  
24 Time window to act A definitive statement of when the recipient should take the actions 
specified in the alert  
26 Where to go for more information A definitive statement of places to seek additional information regard-
ing the event precipitating the alert 
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Factor Description 
3 Public awareness of WEA Public knowledge of WEA prior to issuance of an alert, developed 
through outreach via media channels (TV news reports, radio news 
reports, newspaper stories) 
30 Explain what has happened A definitive statement of the event that has precipitated the alert 
32 Lead time provided The amount of time between the issuance of the alert and the mo-
ment when action must be taken 
33 Degree of wasted alerts History of unneeded alerts 
37 Confirmation via social media Information contained in the alert is disseminated by others through 
social media networks such as Facebook and Twitter 
4 Opt-out rate The percentage of alert receivers who choose to disable the receipt 
of future alerts 
44 Redundancy of alerting Information contained in the alert is also available through other 
channels such as TV and radio news 
48 Alerts viewed as spam Alerts are prejudged as spam 
55 Local jurisdictions activity uncoordinat-
ed 
The level of cooperation between senders within a region, as evi-
denced by avoidance of redundant alerting, agreement between 
alerts, etc. 
7 Frequency The time rate at which alerts are received (e.g., alerts/month) 
70 Explain why I should act Provides a justification for the action specified in the alert 
71 Message in primary language Alert is provided in the primary language of the receiver 
8 History of final communication Issuance of a final communication (e.g., all-clear notice) at the end of 
the event 
99 Type of alert Presidential, Imminent Threat, or AMBER 
Table 3: Public Model Outputs 
Factor Description 
100 Hearing Recipient receives and reads the alert 
101 Understanding Recipient comprehends the information provided in the alert 
102 Believing Recipient accepts the alert as true 
103 Acting Recipient takes action stated in the alert 
1.2.3 Alert Originator Trust Model 
The AO trust model examines the interaction of factors that influence the AO’s trust in the WEA 
service. We identified the factors contributing to trust and their interactions through research of 
public alerting literature and discussions with AOs. Figure 3 shows the results of these efforts in a 
directed graph, in which arrows show the relationships between factors. 
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Figure 3: WEA Alert Originator BBN 
Similarly to the public trust model, we quantified the relationships between these factors through 
surveys and validated them with interviews of AOs. We captured the results in a BBN imple-
mented on AgenaRisk. For details about the creation of the model and the BBN, see the Wireless 
Emergency Alerts: Trust Model Technical Report [Stoddard 2013]. 
Table 4 and Table 5 show the model inputs and outputs, respectively. 
Table 4: Factor Descriptions for Alert Originator Model Inputs 
Factor Definition 
Appropriateness The degree to which WEA provides an alerting solution that is appropriate 
to the event 
 Urgency The degree of immediacy associated with an event is consistent with WEA 
usage 
 Severity The degree of impact associated with an event is consistent with WEA 
usage 
 Certainty The verifiability of the associated event is sufficient to justify a WEA mes-
sage 
 Geographic breadth The size and location of the geographic region impacted by the emergency 
event is consistent with WEA capabilities 
 Time of day The time of day (e.g., waking hours, middle of the night) when the alert is 
to be issued 
 Responsibility The AO's obligation and authority to issue the alert (i.e., is it clear that the 
responsibility and authority to issue the alert resides with the AO, or could 
some other organizations be responsible for issuing the alert?) 
 CMU/SEI-2013-SR-026 | 8 
Table 4: Factor Descriptions for Alert Originator Model Inputs 
Factor Definition 
Availability The degree to which the WEA system is capable of being used when 
needed to issue an alert 
 System readiness The degree to which the WEA service is operable and ready for use when 
needed 
 System accessibility The ability of AOs to gain access and admittance to the WEA service 
when and where desired 
 Remote/portable access The ability of AOs to generate WEA messages from remote locations 
 System reliability The degree to which AOs may depend on the WEA system to operate 
correctly when needed 
 System ease of use The facility (or difficulty) with which AOs may use the WEA service to issue 
alerts 
 Magnitude of effort The amount of time and work needed to issue the alert 
 Cross-system integration The ability of the WEA service to work in conjunction with other emergency 
management systems 
 Templates The availability of predefined formats and information to accelerate and 
ease the process of alert issuance 
 Training Creation of skills, competencies, and knowledge for AOs 
 Skills/competencies The aptitude and capability to operate the WEA service effectively 
 Understanding The knowledge of the operational characteristics of the WEA service 
 Practice The exercising of skills needed to operate the WEA service effectively 
 Security The degree of confidence that the WEA service is robust against attempt-
ed cyber attacks (e.g., spoofing, tampering, and denial-of-service attacks) 
Effectiveness The degree to which the WEA service accomplishes its intended purpose 
 System feedback The quality and value of information describing system function that is 
provided by the WEA service to the AO  
 Real-time system feedback Information from the WEA service reporting the status of the current WEA 
message dissemination process (e.g., message delivered, message re-
jected) 
 Historical system feedback Information from the WEA service regarding prior performance (e.g., dis-
semination time, alert geolocation data) 
 Public feedback history Information received from the public regarding prior WEA messages (e.g., 
"thanks for warning me," “don't wake me at night") 
 After-action review data Knowledge resulting from in-house review and analysis of prior WEA mes-
sage disseminations 
 Timeliness The ability of the WEA service to disseminate a WEA message within a 
suitable time frame 
 Message understandability The ability to convey necessary information within the constraints of the 
WEA message 
 Accuracy The ability of the WEA system to disseminate correct alert information to 
intended recipients 
 Message accuracy The ability of the WEA service to disseminate alerts with the message 
content intended by the AO 
 Location accuracy The ability of the WEA service to disseminate alerts to the defined loca-
tions 
 Public awareness/outreach The establishment of prior awareness and public education regarding 
WEA services 
 Alert frequency The number of WEA messages issued within an area in the immediate 
past 
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Table 5: Alert Originator Model Outputs 
Factor Definition 
Appropriateness The degree to which WEA provides an alerting solution that is appropri-
ate to the event 
Availability The degree to which the WEA service is capable of being used when 
needed to issue an alert 
Effectiveness The degree to which the WEA service accomplishes its intended pur-
pose 
WEA utilization The degree to which the AO is willing to use the WEA service 
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2 Using the Trust Models 
We developed the two trust models using the application AgenaRisk, Version 6.0. To eliminate 
the need for future users to purchase or subscribe to this software, we configured the models to 
run on a free version of the software application—AgenaRisk Free. This version of the application 
has some limitations not found in the commercial version, as shown in Table 6.  However, for 
purposes of running these models, these limitations do not apply. 
Table 6: Differences Between Versions of AgenaRisk 
Feature AgenaRisk Free AgenaRisk Pro 
Save model containing ranked nodes Limited to maximum of 5 Unlimited 
Save model containing ranked nodes Limited to maximum of 5 Unlimited 
Save model containing multiple Bayesian 
network objects 
Limited to maximum of 2 Unlimited 
Maintenance support None Unlimited for duration of subscription 
Upgrades None Unlimited for duration of subscription 
Cost Free Subscription 
The models can be run on AgenaRisk Free using the following procedure: 
1. Access http://www.agenarisk.com/products/free_download.shtml 
2. Select the Windows version for download: AgenaRisk_6_0_Free_Release_1312_
win32bit.exe 
3. Download and review the README file for AgenaRisk, which is also on the same web 
page. 
4. Install the application following the instructions in the README file. 
5. Start the AgenaRisk application. 
6. Load either of the two models by clicking File and then clicking Open Model. 
a. The public trust model is WEA Public BBN-v030. 
b. The alert originator trust model is WEA AO BBN-v090. 
7. After the model is loaded, the application displays the model’s risk map. Use the mouse to 
click the Risk Table. 
8. For ease in configuring the inputs, order the risk objects in the same order as they appear in 
the simulation spreadsheet. 
a. The public trust model simulations file is 130304 JPE Public BBN structure. 
b. The alert originator model simulations file is 130425 JPE AO BBN structure. 
9. To minimize time invested in configuring the model, enter up to four scenario inputs prior to 
running the simulation. 
a. The application starts with one scenario open, so click Scenarios, and Add a New Sce-
nario three times. 
b. Click the Active boxes for Scenarios 2–4 to make them active and visible in the appli-
cation. The boxes associated with the Display on Risk Graphs are selected by default 
for all the scenarios. 
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10. Verify that the Auto Calculate button is not selected. 
11. Enter the simulation inputs for the scenarios based on the definitions contained in the simula-
tion files. Note that no answer or a blank in a cell will cause the simulation to use a uniform-
ly distributed probability for the risk object. 
12. Because the simulations were run with inputs set at known values—or either 0%, 100%, or 
uniformly distributed between these values—input and output risk graphs are not of interest, 
so click Risk Graphs, and then click Close All Graphs. 
13. Run the simulation by clicking the Run Calculation button. 
14. When the simulation has completed, select the appropriate output risk objects to view their 
risk graphs and obtain the median value. 
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3 Public Trust Model Simulations 
3.1 Defining Simulation Scenarios 
The public trust model includes 20 input factors. For the simulations, we evaluated these factors 
in three states: 
1. 0% probability – The factor is absent for the simulation. 
2. 100% probability – The factor is present for the simulation. 
3. Uniformly distributed probability between 0% and 100% – We assert no knowledge of the 
absence or presence of the factor for the simulation. 
Evaluating all combinations of all factors in all states would require 320 (>3 billion) simulation 
runs—clearly an unreasonable amount. To circumvent this combinatorial explosion, we chose to 
group the factors in five categories, as shown in Table 7: 
1. message characteristics 
2. history 
3. confirmation 
4. preparation 
5. alert process 
Table 7: Factor Groupings for Public Trust Model 
Category Factor 
Message characteristics 010_Action to take 
021_Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
023_Who should act 
024_Time window to act 
026_Where to go for more information 
030_Explain what has happened 
070_Explain why I should act 
071_Message in primary language 
History 008_History of final communication 
033_Degree of wasted alerts 
007_Frequency 
020_History of relevance 
Confirmation 037_Confirmation via social media 
015_Easy additional follow-us mechanisms 
044_Redundancy of alerting 
Preparation 003_Public awareness of WEA 
Alert process 012_Alert source 
032_Lead time provided 
055_Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
099_Type of alert 
We could now simplify our investigations to examine the interactions between these five groups 
and the interactions within each group. To bring these interactions into focus, we ran three types 
of simulations: single factor simulations, multifactor simulations, and random simulations. 
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3.1.1 Single-Factor Simulations 
The single-factor simulation efforts focused on assessing the sensitivity of the 20 individual fac-
tors identified in the public trust model. For each factor in each category, we configured a simula-
tion run in which we set the factor under analysis to 0% probability and set all the other factors to 
uniform probability distribution. Next, we repeated this process with each factor set to 100% 
probability rather than 0%. 
These single-factor simulations supported the assessment of the individual impact of each factor. 
3.1.2 Multifactor Simulations 
Multifactor simulations investigated interactions between combinations of factors within and 
across the groups noted in Table 7. For example, the Confirmation category has three factors 
(037_Confirmation via social media, 015_Easy additional follow-us mechanisms, and 
044_Redundancy of alerting). Using a factorial design approach, we treated each factor as an in-
dependent variable. Since there are three factors and two levels (0% and 100%), the design would 
have 2ଷ or eight different experimental conditions or runs. Using the factorial design to consider 
the Message Characteristics category with its eight factors would require 2଼ or 256 runs to ac-
count for the all variations. 
To address the exponential growth when the number of factors increases, statisticians have devel-
oped the fractional factorial design, which involves a simple fraction (e.g., ½ or ¼) of the experi-
mental conditions in a corresponding factorial design [Penn State 2012]. The fractional factorial 
design takes advantage of redundancies observed in the factorial design to reduce the number of 
runs needed. Through the use of a balance property, in which every level of a factor appears the 
same number of times at every level of each of the other factors, fractional factorial design very 
closely approximates the results of a factorial design in an efficient manner because the lower 
order effects in the factorial design are estimated [Wu 2009]. A 2௞ି௣	design is a fractional facto-
rial design with k factors, each at two levels, consisting of 2௞ି௣ runs. This means that it is a 
(2p)th fraction of the 2௞ full factorial design in which the fraction is determined by p defining 
words, and a “word” consists of letters that are the names of the factors denoted by 1, 2, … , k. A 
side effect of using fractional factorial designs is the consequence of aliasing of factorial effects. 
See Wu and Hamada’s work for further details [Wu 2009]. 
Since the Preparation category has only one factor, the single-factor simulations covered all of its 
experimental conditions. For the other four categories in the public trust model, Table 8 through 
Table 11 show the multifactor simulation runs. Each table represents one factor grouping from 7, 
with the factors internal to the grouping established using Plackett-Burman fractional factorial 
designs [Giesbrecht 2004]. We used a commercial statistical software application to select the 
fractional factorial designs that would ensure coverage of the factor space and provide results con-
taining the greatest possible amount of information. In Table 8 through Table 11, the table titles 
identify the fractional factorial design selected, where resolution indicates the interactions among 
the main factors and the lower level factors. For each category, we executed one run for each ex-
perimental condition identified in its associated table. In that run, we set the factors from other 
categories to uniform probability distribution. 
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Table 8: Message Characteristics Category (8 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution III) 
Simulation Run 
Factors 
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41 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 U 
42 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 U 
43 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 U 
44 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 U 
45 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 U 
46 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 U 
47 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 U 
48 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 U 
49 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 U 
50 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 U 
51 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 U 
52 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
Table 9: History Category (4 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution IV) 
Simulation Run 
Factors 
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53 1 1 1 1 U 
54 1 1 0 0 U 
55 1 0 1 0 U 
56 1 0 0 1 U 
57 0 1 1 0 U 
58 0 1 0 1 U 
59 0 0 1 1 U 
60 0 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
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Table 10: Confirmation Category (3 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution III) 
Simulation Run 
Factors 
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61 1 1 0 U 
62 1 0 1 U 
63 0 1 1 U 
64 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = % probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
Table 11: Alert Process Category (4 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution IV) 
Simulation Run 
Factors 
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65 1 1 1 1 U 
66 1 1 0 0 U 
67 1 0 1 0 U 
68 1 0 0 1 U 
69 0 1 1 0 U 
70 0 1 0 1 U 
71 0 0 1 1 U 
72 0 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
3.1.3 Random-Input Simulations 
For the public trust model, we ran 27 simulations with inputs randomly set to either 0%, 100%, or 
a uniform probability distribution between these values (Runs 73–100), as shown in Table 12. We 
used stochastic, or probabilistic, simulations, in which one or more input variables are random. A 
stochastic simulation produces output that is itself random and therefore gives only one data point 
indicating how the system might behave. 
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Table 12: Random-Input Simulations 
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73 U 1 0 0 1 0 1 0 U U U 1 0 U 0 1 1 1 U 1 
74 1 U 1 1 0 0 U 0 U 0 U U U 1 U U U U U U 
75 0 0 1 0 U U U U 1 1 0 0 1 U 0 0 1 0 1 1 
76 U 1 U 0 0 U 0 U 0 1 U U U U 0 U U 1 U U 
77 1 U 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 U U 1 0 U 1 U U 
78 1 1 U U 0 1 0 1 0 U U 0 1 1 U 1 U 0 0 1 
79 1 1 1 U 0 U 1 U U 0 1 0 0 0 U U U U U U 
80 0 0 U 1 U 1 0 1 0 U 0 1 U 1 1 1 1 0 U 1 
81 1 U U U 1 1 U 0 0 0 0 1 1 U 1 1 U U 0 1 
82 1 1 1 U 1 0 1 0 0 0 U U 0 U 1 1 U 1 U U 
83 1 0 0 U 1 U 1 0 1 U 1 0 0 U 0 1 1 U 0 0 
84 U U U 0 1 U 0 0 U 1 0 0 U 1 0 U 0 0 1 1 
85 0 U 0 U U 0 U 1 0 1 0 0 1 1 U U 1 1 U U 
86 U U 0 1 1 U 0 1 0 0 U 1 U 1 U 1 1 U 1 1 
87 1 1 0 1 U 0 U 0 0 U 0 U U 1 U 1 0 U 0 1 
88 U U 0 1 0 U 0 0 1 1 0 U 0 1 1 0 U 1 1 0 
89 U U 1 U U U 1 U 1 1 0 1 U 0 1 1 0 U 1 1 
90 0 U U 1 1 U 1 0 1 1 0 0 U 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 
91 U 0 1 U 1 0 U U 1 U 0 U 1 U 1 0 0 U 0 U 
92 U 1 0 U 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 U U 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 
93 U 0 0 U 0 1 U 0 1 U U 1 0 0 1 U U U U U 
94 0 U U 1 U 1 0 1 0 U 0 1 0 U 1 U U U 0 U 
95 1 0 1 0 U U 1 0 U U 0 1 U 1 1 U U 1 0 1 
96 0 1 1 U 0 U 1 U 1 U U 1 U 1 1 U U U 1 U 
97 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 U U U 0 1 0 U 1 
98 U 1 1 1 U U U 0 1 U 0 1 U 0 0 1 1 U 0 1 
99 1 U 1 1 U 0 U 0 1 0 1 U 1 U 0 U 1 U 0 0 
100 0 0 0 1 0 0 U 0 U 1 1 U 0 U 1 U 1 0 U 0 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
3.1.4 Special-Case Input Simulations 
In the last set of simulations with the public trust model, we ran seven special cases involving the 
inputs shown in Table 13. These simulations were defined to drive the model outputs to extreme 
values. 
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Table 13: Special-Case Input Simulations 
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101 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
102 U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 
103 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
104 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
105 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
106 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
107 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
3.2 Simulation Results 
Table 14 shows the results of the previously defined 107 simulation runs. The primary outputs of 
the model are the following nodes: 
 100_Hearing 
 101_Understanding 
 102_Believing 
 103_Acting 
 004_Opt-out rate 
 048_Alerts viewed as spam 
 001_Relevance 
The values in Table 14 represent the likelihood of the truth of the output. So a value of 48 for 
100_Hearing represents a 48% likelihood that a member of the public in the area receiving the 
alert will hear it.
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Table 14: Simulation Results 
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1 48 27 14 8 52 37 67 
2 48 27 15 9 52 37 67 
3 48 27 15 9 52 37 67 
4 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
5 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
6 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
7 48 27 15 9 52 35 73 
8 48 28 15 9 52 37 67 
9 48 27 15 9 52 37 67 
10 49 27 15 9 52 39 67 
11 49 27 15 9 52 40 67 
12 48 27 15 9 52 37 67 
13 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
14 48 27 15 9 52 37 67 
15 47 26 14 8 49 35 67 
16 48 27 15 9 52 37 67 
17 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
18 48 27 15 9 52 37 67 
19 49 26 14 8 55 37 67 
20 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
21 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
22 48 27 14 8 52 37 67 
23 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
24 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
25 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
26 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
27 49 27 15 8 52 40 56 
28 48 27 14 8 52 37 67 
29 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
30 48 27 15 8 52 36 67 
31 48 27 15 8 52 35 67 
32 48 27 14 8 52 38 67 
Table 14: Simulation Results 
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33 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
34 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
35 50 28 15 9 55 40 67 
36 49 27 15 8 52 38 67 
37 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
38 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
39 47 28 15 9 49 37 67 
40 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
41 48 28 15 9 52 35 73 
42 49 26 15 9 52 35 73 
43 49 27 15 8 52 40 56 
44 49 26 14 8 52 40 56 
45 48 27 15 9 52 35 73 
46 49 28 15 8 52 40 56 
47 49 28 16 9 52 40 56 
48 49 27 15 8 52 40 56 
49 48 28 15 9 52 35 73 
50 48 26 14 8 52 35 73 
51 49 28 15 8 52 40 56 
52 48 26 14 8 52 35 73 
53 49 27 15 9 53 42 67 
54 48 27 15 8 52 36 67 
55 49 27 15 8 52 39 67 
56 48 27 15 8 52 33 67 
57 49 27 15 8 53 43 67 
58 48 27 15 9 52 36 67 
59 49 27 15 9 52 38 67 
60 48 27 14 8 52 34 67 
61 50 28 15 9 55 40 67 
62 47 26 14 8 49 35 67 
63 47 27 15 8 49 35 67 
64 50 27 15 9 55 40 67 
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Table 14: Simulation Results 
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65 49 26 14 8 55 37 67 
66 47 28 15 9 49 37 67 
67 49 26 14 8 55 37 67 
68 47 28 15 9 49 37 67 
69 49 26 14 8 55 37 67 
70 47 28 15 9 49 37 67 
71 49 26 14 8 55 37 67 
72 47 28 15 9 49 37 67 
73 49 27 15 9 54 37 73 
74 48 26 14 8 52 36 67 
75 51 27 14 8 57 40 67 
76 51 28 16 9 55 46 56 
77 48 26 14 8 50 39 56 
78 48 29 16 9 49 39 56 
79 48 27 15 9 52 36 73 
80 47 27 15 8 49 34 56 
81 45 26 14 8 46 31 67 
82 46 25 14 9 48 31 73 
83 49 27 15 9 52 40 73 
84 51 27 15 8 57 42 56 
85 48 28 15 9 52 36 67 
86 49 27 15 8 55 37 56 
87 47 27 15 9 49 34 67 
Table 14: Simulation Results 
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88 48 26 14 8 52 36 56 
89 47 25 14 9 51 31 73 
90 47 24 14 8 51 32 73 
91 46 26 14 8 46 33 67 
92 52 29 16 9 58 53 56 
93 47 25 14 8 49 35 67 
94 46 27 15 9 46 34 56 
95 45 26 14 9 46 31 73 
96 47 26 15 9 52 33 73 
97 50 27 15 8 53 47 56 
98 48 27 16 9 52 36 67 
99 49 28 15 9 52 42 67 
100 48 26 14 8 49 39 67 
101 45 28 16 10 45 30 73 
102 48 27 15 8 52 37 67 
103 52 27 14 8 58 53 56 
104 50 26 14 8 57 37 73 
105 51 26 14 8 57 43 56 
106 46 25 14 8 46 34 56 
107 50 26 14 8 55 40 56 
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4 Alert Originator Trust Model Simulations 
4.1 Defining Simulation Scenarios 
The AO trust model includes 26 input factors. For the simulations, we evaluated these factors in 
three states: 
1. 0% probability – The factor is absent for the simulation. 
2. 100% probability – The factor is present for the simulation. 
3. Uniformly distributed probability between 0% and 100% – We have no knowledge of the 
absence or presence of the factor for the simulation. 
Evaluating all combinations of all factors in all states would require 326 (>2.5 trillion simulation 
runs—clearly an unreasonable amount. To circumvent this combinatorial explosion, we chose to 
group the factors in nine categories, as shown in Table 15:  
1. event characteristics 
2. system characteristics 
3. ease of use 
4. system performance 
5. training 
6. governance 
7. history 
8. understandability 
9. public awareness 
Table 15: Factor Groupings for AO Trust Model 
Category Factor 
Event characteristics Urgency 
Severity 
Certainty 
Geographic breadth 
Time of day 
System characteristics System readiness 
System accessibility 
System reliability 
Ease of use Magnitude of effort 
Cross-system integration 
Templates 
System performance Timeliness 
Message accuracy 
Location accuracy 
Real-time system feedback 
Training Skills/competencies 
Understanding 
Practice 
Security 
Governance Responsibility 
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Category Factor 
History Historical system feedback 
Public feedback history 
After-action review data 
Alert frequency 
Understandability Message understandability 
Public awareness Public awareness/outreach 
We could now simplify our investigations to examine the interactions between these nine groups 
and the interactions within each group. To bring these interactions into focus, we ran four types of 
simulations: single-factor simulations, multifactor simulations, random simulations, and special-
case simulations. 
4.1.1 Single-Factor Simulations 
The initial simulation efforts focused on assessing the sensitivity of the 26 individual factors iden-
tified in the AO trust model. For each factor in each category, we configured a simulation run in 
which we set the factor under analysis to 0% probability and set all the other factors to uniform 
probability distribution. Next, we repeated this process with each factor set to 100% probability 
rather than 0%. 
4.1.2 Multifactor Simulations 
Multifactor simulations investigated interactions between combinations of factors within and 
across the groups noted in Table 15. For the AO trust model, we used the fractional factorial de-
sign, as shown in Table 16 through Table 21. 
Table 16: Event Characteristics Category (5 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution III) 
Simulation Run 
Factors 
Urgency Severity Certainty 
Geographic 
Breadth Time of Day 
All Other 
Factors 
53 1 1 1 1 0 U 
54 1 1 0 0 1 U 
55 1 0 1 0 1 U 
56 1 0 0 1 0 U 
57 0 1 1 0 0 U 
58 0 1 0 1 1 U 
59 0 0 1 1 1 U 
60 0 0 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
Table 17: System Characteristics Category (3 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution III) 
Simulation 
Run 
Factors 
System Readiness System  
Accessibility 
System Reliability All Other Factors 
61 1 1 0 U 
62 1 0 1 U 
63 0 1 1 U 
64 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
 CMU/SEI-2013-SR-026 | 22 
Table 18: Ease of Use Category (3 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution III) 
Simulation 
Run 
Factors 
Magnitude of Effort Cross-System  
Integration 
Templates All Other Factors 
65 1 1 0 U 
66 1 0 1 U 
67 0 1 1 U 
68 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
Table 19: System Performance Category (4 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution IV) 
Simulation 
Run 
Factors 
Timeliness Message  
Accuracy 
Location  
Accuracy 
Real-Time Sys-
tem Feedback 
All Other  
Factors 
69 1 1 1 1 U 
70 1 1 0 0 U 
71 1 0 1 0 U 
72 1 0 0 1 U 
73 0 1 1 0 U 
74 0 1 0 1 U 
75 0 0 1 1 U 
76 0 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
Table 20: Training Category (4 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution IV) 
Simulation 
Run 
Factors 
Skills /  
Competencies 
Understanding Practice Security All Other  
Factors 
77 1 1 1 1 U 
78 1 1 0 0 U 
79 1 0 1 0 U 
80 1 0 0 1 U 
81 0 1 1 0 U 
82 0 1 0 1 U 
83 0 0 1 1 U 
84 0 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
Table 21: History Category (4 factors @ 2 levels each Resolution IV) 
Simulation 
Run 
Factors 
Historical Sys-
tem Feedback 
Public Feed-
back History 
After-Action 
Review Data 
Alert  
Frequency 
All Other  
Factors 
85 1 1 1 1 U 
86 1 1 0 0 U 
87 1 0 1 0 U 
88 1 0 0 1 U 
89 0 1 1 0 U 
90 0 1 0 1 U 
91 0 0 1 1 U 
92 0 0 0 0 U 
Note: 0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution. 
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4.1.3 Random-Input Simulations 
For the AO trust model, we ran 68 simulations with inputs randomly set to either 0%, 100%, or a 
uniform probability distribution between these values (Runs 93–160), as shown in Table 22. We 
used stochastic, or probabilistic, simulations, in which one or more input variables are random. A 
stochastic simulation produces output that is itself random and therefore gives only one data point 
indicating how the system might behave. 
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Table 22: Random-Input Simulations (0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution) 
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93 0 1 0 1 0 U 0 U U 1 1 0 U U 0 0 U U 0 0 U 0 1 0 U U 
94 U 0 U U U U U 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 U 1 1 U 0 
95 0 1 0 0 U 0 1 U 1 1 U 1 U 1 0 U 0 U 0 0 0 U 1 1 U 1 
96 0 0 U 1 0 1 U U 1 0 1 1 U 0 U 1 1 0 0 1 1 U 0 0 U 0 
97 1 0 1 1 1 U U 1 U 0 0 0 U U 1 1 0 0 0 1 U 0 1 1 0 0 
98 1 1 1 U U 0 U U 0 0 U U U U 1 1 U 1 U 0 U U U 1 1 1 
99 0 1 1 1 U U U 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 U 1 U 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 
100 U 1 1 0 U U 0 1 1 0 U 0 U U U 1 U 0 U 1 1 0 1 1 U U 
101 U 0 U 0 1 0 U 1 1 U 0 U U 1 1 U U 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 U 
102 1 U 0 1 1 1 U 0 0 1 0 1 U 0 U 0 U 1 U 0 0 1 0 U 1 1 
103 0 0 U 1 U U 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 U 1 0 U 1 1 U 0 1 0 U 0 
104 1 0 U 1 U 0 U U 0 0 U U U 0 0 U 1 U U 1 1 0 U 0 U U 
105 1 1 0 1 U U 1 0 0 U U 1 0 U 0 1 0 U 0 U U 1 1 0 U U 
106 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 U 1 1 1 U U 
107 U 0 U 0 1 U 0 0 U U 1 1 U 1 0 0 U 1 0 1 0 0 U 0 U 1 
108 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 U U U 1 U 0 0 U U 1 0 1 0 U 1 1 U 0 
109 U 0 1 U U 1 1 0 1 U 1 U U U U 0 0 U U 1 U 0 U 1 0 0 
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Table 22: Random-Input Simulations (0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution) 
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110 1 0 U 0 U 1 1 1 U 0 1 0 0 1 0 U 1 U 1 U 1 0 1 U 1 0 
111 0 0 U 1 0 0 1 1 U U 0 0 1 U U U 0 U U 1 1 1 U U 0 U 
112 1 0 U U 0 1 1 U 0 U 1 0 U 0 U U 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 
113 0 U 1 U U 1 1 1 U U U 1 U 1 U U U U U 0 0 1 U 0 0 0 
114 U 0 U 1 1 1 U 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 U U U 1 0 1 1 0 0 U 
115 1 U 1 1 1 U 0 1 0 U 0 1 U 1 U 0 U 0 1 U U 1 U 0 U U 
116 U U 0 U 1 U 1 U 0 0 1 U 1 1 0 0 1 U 1 0 U 0 1 1 0 0 
117 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 U 1 0 U 1 U 0 1 1 1 0 0 U U 1 1 1 U U 
118 1 U U 0 0 1 U U 0 0 U U 1 1 0 0 U 0 1 U 1 0 0 1 U U 
119 1 U U 0 U 1 1 1 0 U 1 0 U U 1 U U 0 U U 0 1 U 1 1 U 
120 U 0 0 1 1 U 1 1 U 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 U 0 1 0 U U U 1 0 U 
121 1 U U 0 1 0 U U 0 U 0 U 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 U 1 0 1 1 
122 U U 0 U 1 1 1 1 U 0 1 0 U 0 1 0 1 U 0 U 1 1 1 0 1 U 
123 1 1 0 1 0 0 U 0 1 1 1 U 0 1 1 1 U 1 0 1 0 U U U U 1 
124 U 1 0 U 0 0 1 U U U U U U U 1 1 0 1 U U 0 1 0 U 1 1 
125 0 0 1 0 0 0 U 1 U 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 U 0 0 0 0 U 1 U U 0 
126 1 U U 0 U U 1 0 1 0 0 1 U 0 U 0 0 U 1 0 0 1 U 0 U 1 
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Table 22: Random-Input Simulations (0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution) 
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127 0 0 0 U 1 0 0 U U 0 U 1 U 1 U 1 U U 1 1 U 0 1 1 0 1 
128 1 1 1 1 U 0 0 1 U U 0 0 U 1 U U U 0 1 1 U 0 U U U 0 
129 0 U U U 1 1 0 0 1 U U 0 0 1 1 1 U 0 U 1 0 U 0 0 U 0 
130 0 U U U 0 1 U U 1 U 0 0 1 U U 0 0 U U 1 U 0 U 1 0 0 
131 0 1 U 1 0 U 0 U U 0 U U U 0 U U 0 0 1 1 0 U 1 1 U 1 
132 U 0 0 0 1 0 1 U U U U U U 1 1 1 1 0 U 0 U U 1 1 U 0 
133 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 U 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 U 0 U 0 U 0 U U 0 0 0 
134 1 1 1 U U 0 0 0 0 U 1 U U U U 0 U U U 0 0 0 0 U U U 
135 0 1 U U 1 U 0 U 0 U U 0 0 0 1 1 1 U 0 U 0 0 U 1 U 0 
136 U 0 U U 0 1 1 U 1 1 U 0 U 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 U 0 0 U U 1 
137 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 U 1 U 0 1 0 0 0 U U 0 1 U U 1 1 U 0 
138 U 1 U 1 U 1 U 0 1 1 1 1 0 U U 1 U U 1 1 1 1 U U 1 1 
139 1 U U 0 U 1 U U 0 1 0 0 0 1 U 1 U 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 U U 
140 U U 0 U 1 U 0 1 0 0 U U U U 0 0 1 1 U U 0 0 1 U 1 1 
141 0 U U 0 U U U 0 U U 1 1 0 U 1 0 1 U 1 1 U U U U 0 1 
142 1 0 U 0 U 0 0 1 U 0 0 U 1 U U 1 U 1 1 0 1 U 1 U 1 0 
143 0 1 U 1 1 0 0 U 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 U U 1 U U 0 0 1 0 0 
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Table 22: Random-Input Simulations (0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution) 
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144 U U U 1 U 1 1 0 1 0 U U 1 U 1 1 0 U 0 U 0 U 0 0 0 U 
145 1 1 1 U 0 0 U 1 1 0 1 U 0 1 U 0 1 0 U 1 0 1 U 0 U U 
146 0 1 1 U 0 U 1 1 0 0 U 1 U U 0 0 1 U U U 1 1 U 0 0 U 
147 U U 1 0 0 U 1 1 U 1 0 0 1 U U 1 U 0 1 0 1 U 0 U U U 
148 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 U 1 1 1 0 1 U 0 U 1 U 0 U U U 1 1 U 1 
149 U U U 0 1 0 1 U U U 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 U 0 1 1 1 1 1 
150 1 U U 0 1 1 0 U 1 U U 0 1 U 0 U 0 0 U 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 
151 1 U 0 1 0 0 U 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 U U 0 1 0 U 0 0 0 
152 U 0 U U U U U 1 U 1 U 0 0 U 0 U 0 U 1 1 0 U 1 1 U U 
153 1 1 1 0 1 U 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 U 1 U 0 0 1 U 1 U U 1 0 U 
154 1 1 U U U 0 U 1 U 0 U 0 1 0 1 U 1 U U 1 0 U U 1 U 0 
155 1 1 U 1 1 U U U U 1 0 U U 0 0 U 0 1 1 0 0 U U U 1 0 
156 0 U U 0 U 1 0 U 1 U 0 0 1 U 0 U 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 U U 
157 0 0 0 0 0 U 0 U U U 1 U U U 0 U 1 U U 1 U U U U U 1 
158 1 U U 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 U 0 0 U 0 0 U U 0 1 1 0 U U 1 1 
159 0 1 U 0 U 1 0 U 0 U 0 1 0 0 0 1 U 1 1 1 0 U 1 U U U 
160 U 0 U 1 0 U U 0 U 1 0 0 0 0 U 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 U 
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4.1.4 Special-Case Input Simulations 
In the last set of simulations with the AO trust model, we ran 12 special cases involving the inputs shown in Table 23. These simulations were designed to 
drive the model outputs to extreme values. 
Table 23: Special Cases (0 = 0% probability, 1 = 100% probability, U = uniform probability distribution) 
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161 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
162 U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U U 
163 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
164 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
165 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
166 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
167 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
168 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
169 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 
170 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
171 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 
172 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 
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4.2 Simulation Results 
Table 24 shows the results of the previously defined 172 simulation runs. The primary outputs of the model are 
the following nodes: 
 Utilization 
 Appropriateness 
 Effectiveness 
 Availability 
Table 24: AO Simulation 
Results 
Si
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n 
R
un
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U
til
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n 
A
pp
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te
 
Ef
fe
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A
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y 
1 39 72 69 71 
2 40 73 69 71 
3 39 73 69 71 
4 39 72 69 71 
5 39 72 69 71 
6 39 72 69 71 
7 40 72 69 73 
8 39 72 69 71 
9 40 72 69 72 
10 39 72 69 71 
11 38 72 69 71 
12 39 72 69 71 
13 39 72 69 71 
14 38 72 68 71 
15 39 72 69 71 
16 39 72 69 71 
17 39 72 69 72 
18 39 72 69 71 
19 40 72 69 73 
20 39 72 69 71 
21 39 72 69 71 
22 39 72 69 71 
23 40 72 70 71 
24 39 72 69 71 
25 39 72 69 71 
26 39 72 69 71 
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27 38 70 69 71 
28 38 71 69 71 
29 36 69 69 71 
30 37 70 69 71 
31 38 70 69 71 
32 39 72 69 71 
33 38 72 69 70 
34 38 72 69 71 
35 37 72 69 70 
36 38 72 69 71 
37 38 72 69 71 
38 38 72 68 71 
39 37 72 66 71 
40 38 72 68 71 
41 38 72 68 71 
42 38 72 69 71 
43 38 72 69 71 
44 38 72 69 71 
45 37 72 69 69 
46 38 71 69 71 
47 38 72 68 71 
48 38 72 68 71 
49 36 72 65 71 
50 39 72 69 71 
51 38 72 68 71 
52 38 72 68 71 
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53 41 74 69 71 
54 40 73 69 71 
55 40 73 69 71 
56 35 67 69 71 
57 38 71 69 71 
58 39 72 69 71 
59 39 72 69 71 
60 31 59 69 71 
61 40 72 69 72 
62 38 72 69 70 
63 40 72 69 73 
64 38 72 69 70 
65 39 72 69 72 
66 39 72 69 72 
67 37 72 69 70 
68 37 72 69 69 
69 40 72 70 71 
70 39 72 69 71 
71 37 72 66 71 
72 37 72 66 71 
73 38 72 68 71 
74 38 72 68 71 
75 37 72 66 71 
76 35 72 64 71 
77 41 72 69 73 
78 37 72 69 69 
 CMU/SEI-2013-SR-026 | 30 
Table 24: AO Simulation 
Results 
Si
m
ul
at
io
n 
R
un
 
Outputs 
U
til
iz
at
io
n 
A
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s 
A
va
ila
bi
lit
y 
79 36 72 69 68 
80 40 72 69 73 
81 37 72 69 69 
82 40 72 69 73 
83 40 72 69 73 
84 36 72 69 67 
85 40 72 71 71 
86 37 72 66 71 
87 39 72 70 71 
88 36 72 64 71 
89 40 72 70 71 
90 37 72 66 71 
91 39 72 69 71 
92 35 72 64 71 
93 34 69 68 67 
94 41 71 71 72 
95 37 67 70 72 
96 34 69 64 71 
97 38 74 68 67 
98 41 74 69 70 
99 40 74 68 70 
100 40 73 69 71 
101 36 69 65 74 
102 35 71 66 69 
103 40 71 69 73 
104 36 73 66 69 
105 38 73 69 68 
106 42 75 70 70 
107 33 70 68 67 
108 37 69 69 71 
109 39 72 66 73 
110 39 70 66 74 
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111 38 69 69 72 
112 36 70 64 73 
113 39 71 68 73 
114 37 72 67 70 
115 41 74 69 71 
116 39 69 69 73 
117 39 71 70 70 
118 35 70 65 72 
119 39 71 69 71 
120 39 69 69 74 
121 37 71 70 67 
122 38 69 70 71 
123 37 72 67 70 
124 37 70 67 72 
125 34 66 70 68 
126 41 71 69 74 
127 36 67 69 72 
128 41 75 66 72 
129 34 71 61 71 
130 36 69 67 72 
131 41 72 69 72 
132 36 64 70 73 
133 33 71 68 63 
134 35 74 64 68 
135 33 73 63 66 
136 36 69 63 75 
137 35 70 69 67 
138 43 74 68 74 
139 34 71 59 72 
140 36 69 70 69 
141 37 69 67 73 
142 40 69 71 72 
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143 34 74 57 71 
144 38 72 66 71 
145 41 74 67 72 
146 40 72 69 72 
147 37 70 66 74 
148 41 72 70 72 
149 37 71 68 71 
150 40 72 70 71 
151 35 70 66 70 
152 38 71 67 73 
153 40 74 68 70 
154 41 74 68 72 
155 42 75 67 73 
156 36 69 66 73 
157 31 60 68 71 
158 34 72 65 68 
159 37 71 67 71 
160 36 70 64 72 
161 50 75 72 75 
162 39 72 69 71 
163 20 58 52 61 
164 27 74 52 62 
165 37 60 72 75 
166 26 63 55 70 
167 37 64 72 72 
168 25 58 70 61 
169 39 75 61 73 
170 25 58 52 74 
171 41 75 72 66 
172 23 60 59 66 
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5 Analysis of Simulations 
5.1 Analysis Process 
The purpose of the trust model and the multitude of simulation runs described previously is to identify factors 
and practices that enhance or degrade trust. To identify these factors, we analyzed the results of the simula-
tions. In general, our analysis process had two goals: 
1. Identify those simulations that predicted the highest levels of trust. 
 Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that appear most frequently. These represent 
the actions and practices to promote to maximize trust. 
 Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that are absent most frequently. These repre-
sent the actions and practices to avoid to maximize trust. 
2. Identify those simulations that predicted the lowest levels of trust. 
 Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that appear most frequently. These factors also 
represent the actions and practices to avoid to maximize trust. 
 Examine those simulations to identify the input factors that are absent most frequently. These factors 
represent the actions and practices to promote to maximize trust. 
Thus, the factors that enhance trust are those that are most often present in the simulations predicting high lev-
els of trust, and the factors that are most often absent in the simulations predicting low levels of trust. Like-
wise, the factors that degrade trust are those that are most often present in the simulations predicting low levels 
of trust, and the factors that are most often absent in the simulations predicting high levels of trust. 
Since the models have multiple outputs (e.g., Understanding, Believing, and Acting for the public trust model), 
we can perform this analysis process for each output to identify those factors that enhance or degrade that out-
put. 
Remember that the public trust model responds to input factors as listed in Table 2 and produces outputs as 
listed in Table 3. Likewise, the AO trust model responds to input factors as listed in Table 4 and produces out-
puts as listed in Table 5. We ran the simulations with input probability values set at 100% (input factor is pre-
sent), 0% (input factor is absent), or probability uniformly distributed between 0% and 100% (input factor is 
unknown). 
The analysis process used for each of the models consists of the following steps: 
1. Choose a model output, and sort all of the simulation runs in decreasing order for that output. For exam-
ple, sort the simulation runs of the AO trust model such that the runs that produce the highest values for 
the Utilization factor precede those that produce lower values. 
2. Segment this ordered list into three categories of approximately equal size—those that have the highest 
output values, those that have the middle output values, and those that have the lowest output values. 
Since the list is ordered, this amounts to categorizing the first third of the list as the highest category, the 
second third of the list as the middle category, and the last third of the list as the lowest category. 
3. For the set of simulations in each category, for each factor, 
a. note the frequency of presence; that is, count the number of times the factor is present (=100%) 
b. note the frequency of absence; that is, count the number of times the factor is absent (=0%) 
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4. Within each category, identify the factors that have the highest frequencies of presence and the factors 
that have the highest frequencies of absence. 
5. Interpret the results as follows: 
a. The factors with the highest frequency of presence in the highest output category represent those fac-
tors that enhance trust. 
b. The factors with the highest frequency of absence in the highest output category represent those fac-
tors that degrade trust. 
c. The factors with the highest frequency of presence in the lowest output category represent those fac-
tors that degrade trust. 
d. The factors with the highest frequency of absence in the lowest output category represent those fac-
tors that enhance trust. 
6. Repeat the previous four steps for each of the model outputs. 
5.2 Analysis Results 
Table 25 and Table 26 provide the results we obtained as an outcome of the preceding process. 
Table 25: Analysis Results for Public Trust Model 
Output 
Enhancing Factors 
High Presence in Highest Category High Absence in Lowest Category 
100 Hearing  Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Degree of wasted alerts 
 Type of alert 
 Frequency 
 Message in primary language 
 Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 History of final communication 
101 Understanding  Message in primary language 
 Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
 Lead time provided 
 Message in primary language 
 Explain why I should act 
 Frequency 
 Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
 Who should act 
102 Believing  Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
 Message in primary language 
 Type of alert 
 Message in primary language 
 Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
 Explain why I should act 
 Action to be taken 
 Frequency 
103 Acting  Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
 Explain why I should act 
 Message in primary language 
 Action to be taken 
 Lead time provided 
 Message in primary language 
 Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
 Action to be taken 
 Explain why I should act 
 Frequency 
1 Relevance  Explain why I should act 
 Where to go for more information 
 Who should act 
 Explain why I should act 
 Message in primary language 
 Explain what has happened 
 History of final communication 
 Where to go for more information 
4 Opt-out rate  Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Degree of wasted alerts 
 Type of alert 
 Frequency 
 Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Message in primary language 
 History of final communication 
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48 Alerts viewed as spam  Degree of wasted alerts 
 Frequency 
 Action to take 
 Clarity of message spelling and grammar 
 Frequency 
 Message in primary language 
 Action to take 
 Explain what has happened 
 History of final communication 
Output 
Degrading Factors 
High Absence in Highest Category High Presence in Lowest Category 
100 Hearing  Explain why I should act 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Who should act 
 Time window to act 
 Message in primary language 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 History of relevance 
 Type of alert 
 Who should act 
 Time window to act 
101 Understanding  Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Explain what has happened 
 Explain why I should act 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Type of alert 
102 Believing  Explain why I should act 
 Where to go for more information 
 History of final communication 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Type of alert 
 Who should act 
103 Acting  Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Where to go for more information 
 Explain what has happened 
 History of final communication 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
 Type of alert 
 Degree of wasted alerts 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Where to go for more information 
1 Relevance  Message in primary language  Type of alert 
 Time window to act 
 Degree of wasted alerts 
 Easy additional follow-on mechanisms 
 Local jurisdictions act uncoordinated 
4 Opt-out rate  Redundancy of alerting 
 Time window to act 
 History of final communication 
 Lead time provided 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 History of relevance 
 Type of alert 
48 Alerts viewed as spam  Explain why I should act 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 History of relevance 
 Redundancy of alerting 
 Explain why I should act 
 Who should act 
 History of relevance 
Table 26: Analysis Results for AO Trust Model 
Output 
Enhancing Factors 
High Presence in Highest Category High Absence in Lowest Category 
Appropriateness  Urgency 
 Severity 
 Certainty 
 Geographic breadth 
 Geographic breadth 
 Severity 
 Urgency 
 Time of day 
 Certainty 
Availability  Security 
 System accessibility 
 System reliability 
 Security 
 Magnitude of effort 
 System accessibility 
 Historical system feedback 
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Effectiveness  After-action review data 
 Understanding 
 Message accuracy 
 Time of day 
 Timeliness 
 Message accuracy 
 Public feedback history 
 After-action review data 
 Historical system feedback 
Utilization  Severity 
 Urgency 
 Security 
 System reliability 
 Geographic breadth 
 Time of day 
 Historical system feedback 
 Public feedback history 
Output 
Degrading Factors 
High Absence in Highest Category High Presence in Lowest Category 
Appropriateness  Magnitude of effect 
 System accessibility 
 Timeliness 
 Templates 
 After-action review data 
 Security 
 System reliability 
 System readiness 
 System accessibility 
Availability  Severity 
 Templates 
 Understanding 
 Timeliness 
 Urgency 
 After-action review data 
 Time of day 
 Responsibility 
 Skills/competencies 
Effectiveness  Geographic breadth 
 Security 
 Certainty 
 System accessibility 
 Responsibility 
 Security 
 System readiness 
 Urgency 
 Location accuracy 
Utilization  Practice 
 System accessibility 
 Cross-system integration 
 Understanding 
 Alert frequency 
 Responsibility 
 Practice 
 Skills/competencies 
 Location accuracy 
 System readiness 
We identified these factors through a statistical analysis of the simulation results. As we have shown, some 
factors have stronger relationships to the output factors than others. For additional information concerning 
these relationships, refer to the report Maximizing Trust in the Wireless Emergency Alerts (WEA) Service [SEI 
2013b]. 
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6 Links to Trust Models 
Those wishing to run their own simulations and study trust factors in their own contexts of emergency alerting 
may download the public and AO trust models at the following URL:  
http://resources.sei.cmu.edu/library/asset-view.cfm?assetID=70032 
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